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The Philosophy of Correction and Error and Its Impact on Regulating Differences in Contemporary Creedal Classification

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Abstract: This research aims to explore how Muslims can overcome sectarian differences and achieve unity despite their varying schools of thought, focusing on the significant issue of "right and wrong" in religious discourse. The study emphasizes the need for a scientific approach to address creedal differences and their societal impact, especially in communities affected by sectarianism. The research suggests that theological discourse (kalām) should be distinct from the Qur'anic creed, which is clear and requires no additional tools for comprehension beyond the Arabic language. It concludes that any scholarly interpretations or contradictions in understanding pertain to theological discourse, not the Qur'anic creed itself, where only one truth exists.

Keywords: Correction, Error, Creedal Classification, Qur'anic Creed, ʿIlm al-Kalām (Theological Discourse), Deterministic, Theoretical, Auxiliary Sciences, Fundamental Sciences.

فلسفةُ التَّصْويبِ والتَّخْطِئةِ وآثارُها في ترشيدِ الاختلافِ في التَّصنيفِ العقديّ المُعاصِر

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قسم العقيدة والفكر الاسلامي   قسم العقيدة والفكر الاسلامي   قسم العقيدة والفكر الاسلامي

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الملخص: هذا البحث يهدف إلى مناقشـــة كيفية إزالة الخلافات المذمومة بين المســـلمين وتعزيز وحدتهم، مع التركيز على الاختلافات العقائدية وتأثيرها على المجتمع، خصـوصًـا في المناطق التي تميزت بالطائفية وأدت إلى التفكك المجتمعي. يتناول البحث مسـألة "الصــح والخطأ" في الدين، والتي تحتاج إلى فقهاء متمكنين في أصـــول الدين وأصـــول الفقه لفهمها. يؤكد البحث أن الفهم المختلف للعلماء حول العقيدة القرآنية يعد من علم الكلام وليس من العقيدة نفسـها، حيث إن العقيدة القرآنية واضــحة بذاتها ولا تحتاج إلى أدوات إضـافية لفهمها سوى اللغة التي نزل بها القرآن.

Section One: Conceptual Introduction

Often, some hasten to correct others in their beliefs without considering the intent of the speaker or actor; they judge him in terms of words, actions, and deeds as sinful while neglecting his intentions, both spoken and enacted. It seems as if the purpose of religious observance is to bind people and reprimand them for their mistakes, searching for their shortcomings in the most critical aspect of religion—the domain of creed. Yet, the guidelines established by the earlier scholars were oriented towards seeking excuses and rectifying opinions and beliefs to the best of their ability. Consequently, a primary priority for these scholars was to clarify the meaning of terms, articulate their meanings, and accurately establish the creedal terminology first, followed by an agreement on a unified understanding of it, without overlooking the circumstances of the speaker and the listener. These circumstances vary from one individual to another, as well as from one time and place to another. For all these reasons, we shall endeavor to progress through this research from the premises to the conclusions, aiming to contribute to a knowledge-based perspective that unites the hearts and minds of Muslims, moving away from the fragmentation they currently experience, as follows:

Section One: Clarifying the Concepts of Correction and Error

First: Correction (Al-Taṣwīb)

According to *Maqāyīs al-Lugha*, the root "ṣ-w-b" refers to the descent or settlement of something in its rightful place. Thus, correctness in speech and action is likened to something that descends and settles in its proper position, which is the opposite of error. (al-Qazwīnī, 1399h, 3/317) The term "iṣābah" (hitting the mark) refers to achieving correctness and is also used to describe the intention to achieve correctness, even if it does not materialize. (alfyrwz'ābādá, 1426 H, p.136) ، (alzzabydy, 1965, 2/153) Al-Jurjānī defined it technically as "the reality of a matter that cannot be denied"—meaning that it refers to something established in reality, which cannot be refuted. (al-Jurjānī, 1403 H, 177).

Second: Error (Al-Takhtīʾah)

The linguistic meanings of error revolve around the notion of exceeding or overstepping a boundary. In *Maqāyīs al-Lugha*, the root "kh-ṭ" (whether weak or glottalized) indicates the concept of transgression or departing from the correct path. (al-Qazwīnī, 1399 H, 2/198). The term "akhta'a" refers to deviating from correctness without intent, while intentional error is expressed as "khaṭi'a," referring to deliberate transgression of correctness. (alfyrwz'ābādá, 1426 H, 1615)(alzzabydy, 1965, 1/145) (alrwyfʻy, 1414 H). Abū al-Baqā' al-Kafawī defined *takhtīʾah* (error) in technical terms as "the establishment of an opposite image of the truth, such that it does not easily disappear." (al-Kaffawī D. t., 424).

Third: Correction and Error and Their Relationship to Sin

One of the aspects that many scholars find challenging in the classification of creed, both ancient and modern, is the issue of error in others and the implications of such error that entail labeling them with descriptions of takfir (declaring someone an infidel), tabdīʻ (declaring someone an innovator), and tafsīq (declaring someone a sinner), which leads to falling into sin and the invalidation of action.

It appears that the correlation between these concepts is prevalent in creedal classification; we often find that the error attributed to others is linked to the rulings of takfir, tafsīq, and tabdīʻ, even though there need not be a necessary connection between them. In the context of correction, we can assert a general ruling that every correct individual is rewarded; for Allah, the Exalted, has promised obedience to be rewarded, and He does not break His promise regarding the reward for those who are correct among His servants, as agreed upon by all Muslims.

Regarding the case of error and its implication for sin, this issue can be clarified by examining the meaning of error, which manifests in several forms:

First Type: The term "error" may refer to sin, or it may denote a lack of knowledge. If the first meaning is intended, then any mujtahid (jurisprudent) who fears Allah to the best of their ability is correct and obedient to Allah; thus, they are neither sinful nor blameworthy. If the second meaning is intended, some mujtahids might possess knowledge that is hidden from others, knowledge of the true state of affairs that, had others been aware of it, they would have been obliged to follow it. However, the obligation to follow is lifted due to their inability to grasp it, and they receive a reward for their ijtihad (independent reasoning). Nonetheless, the one who arrives at the truth is entitled to two rewards, as the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) stated in a hadith agreed

upon as authentic: "When a ruler exercises ijtihad and is correct, he receives two rewards; and if he exercises ijtihad and errs, he receives one reward." (al-Bukhārī 13/318, raqm : 7352) (Majmūʿ al-Fatāwá, 20/19)

Second Type: The term "error" may refer to both intentional and unintentional actions. Abū Bakr Ibn al-Anbārī stated that error is synonymous with sin, as the term is used to denote one who sins: "He has erred (khaṭa'a) if he has sinned," and "He makes a mistake (akhta'a) if he deviates from correctness." Additionally, Ibn al-Anbārī refers to the verse: "They said, 'By Allah, you have certainly been preferred over us, and we were indeed sinners' (Yusuf: 91)." The interpreters, including Ibn ʿAbbās, said that it refers to those who are sinful in their actions. He also cited the verse: "They said, 'O our father, ask forgiveness for us of our sins; indeed, we have been sinners' (Yusuf: 97)."

Similarly, the Almighty said to his wife:

"O Joseph, turn away from this. And, [O wife of the Aziz], ask forgiveness for your sin, indeed, you were of the sinful' (Yusuf: 29)." Ibn al-Anbārī explained that the term "sinners" (khāṭiʾīn) was chosen over "errants" (mukhṭiʾīn), even though "he has erred" (akhṭa'a) is more commonly used in speech than "he has made a mistake" (khaṭa). The reason is that "khaṭa" (he has erred) means that he is sinful, while "akhta'a" (he has made a mistake) refers to leaving correctness without being sinful. (Majmūʿ al-Fatāwá, 20/19)

Third Type: The term may also refer to errors in action versus errors in intent. The first refers to the act of aiming at something permissible, such as hunting or a target, but missing it, which may incur expiation (kaffārah) and compensation (diya). The second type refers to an error in intent due to ignorance, as in mistakenly aiming at someone believed to be permissible to kill, but who is actually innocent, such as killing a person in the ranks of the disbelievers only to discover later that he was a Muslim. An error in knowledge falls into this category. Hence, it has been said in one of the opinions that no compensation is due for this type of error because the act was commanded, in contrast to the first type. Moreover, Allah, the Exalted, stated: "There is no blame upon you for that in which you have erred, but what your hearts intended; and ever is Allah Forgiving and Merciful" (Al-Ahzab: 5). This verse differentiates between the two types of error. Allah also said: "Our Lord, do not impose blame upon us if we have forgotten or made a mistake" (**Al-Baqarah**: 286). It has been established in authentic narrations that Allah said, "I have done so." (Majmūʿ al-Fatāwá, 20/19).

Based on the preceding discussion, it can be said that when a reader encounters an error in a school of thought, an intellectual opinion, or a perspective that contradicts their beliefs, they should not hastily issue judgments that would further divide Muslims. Instead, they should perceive from the error and the differences the vastness and mercy among all schools of thought in Islam. Indeed, when Allah Almighty promises goodness, He fulfills it, while in the case of errors, Allah may grant forgiveness out of His generosity and grace, contrary to the beliefs of the Mu'tazila who deny this.

In the scholarly discussions recorded by al-Zajjājī, it is stated:

"Amr ibn ʿUbaid came to Abū ʿAmr ibn al-ʿAlāʾ and said: 'O Abū ʿAmr, does Allah break His promise?' He replied: 'No.' Amr then asked: 'What about the one to whom Allah promised punishment for their deeds? Does He break His promise concerning that?' Abū ʿAmr replied: 'You have come to me from a position of ignorance. The promise is not the same as the threat of punishment. The Arabs do not consider a promise to be a shameful act or a broken vow. Allah, Exalted and Glorified, when He promises, fulfills it. If He threatens but does not carry it out, that is an act of generosity and grace. A broken promise occurs when one promises good and then does not fulfill it.' Amr asked: 'Can you provide evidence for this in the speech of the Arabs?' Abū ʿAmr replied: 'Yes. Have you not heard the words of the poet:

"Neither does my cousin fear my might while I am alive, nor do my sisters fear the threat of one who threatens. And indeed, whether I threaten him or promise him, I am one who breaks his threats and fulfills his promises."

"And the companions of Paradise called to the companions of the Fire, 'Indeed, we have found what our Lord promised us to be true. Have you found what your Lord promised you to be true?' They said, 'Yes.'" (**Al-A'raf**: 44).

It was questioned how both groups expressed themselves with the same wording when it refers to both promise and warning. It was explained that the Arabs say: "I promised him good," and "I warned him of evil." If the mention of good and evil is omitted, the term for good becomes simply "I promised," while for evil it becomes "I warned." (Alnhāwndy, 1419H)

Subsection Two: The Distinction Between the Science of Usul al-Din and Furu' al-Din—Concepts and Definitions:

One of the matters that should be considered in researching the issue of correctness and error is defining what is meant by Usul al-Din (the foundations of religion) or the science of theology (Ilm

al-Kalam) that we aim to clarify within its boundaries. This definition is crucial, particularly since it is commonly asserted that the domains of correctness and error pertain to the branches of religion or the legal matters that are subject to ijtihad (independent reasoning) rather than to rational issues or the foundations of religion, in which differences should not arise, nor should they be the subject of correctness or error. Rather, their basis is rooted in definitive judgment and certainty, which leads to legal rulings concerning takfir (excommunication), tabdī' (declaring someone an innovator), and tafsiq (declaring someone a sinner).

Thus, this subsection is presented to clarify for the reader that there is a distinction between the science of Usul al-Din and its branches (al-Saʿdī, 2014, p.10), and between them and the concept of creed (**Sharh Al-Mawaqif**, 1/37) as defined in the Quran and Sunnah, which constitute the six pillars of faith.

From this, we understand that the science of Usul al-Din, known by its popular names such as Ilm al-Kalam and the science of reasoning and inference, and the larger concept of Aqeedah, differ in their description regarding the pillars of faith in the Book and the Sunnah. The former is an area of ijtihad, whereas the latter is definitive and authoritative. The former allows for differences and scholarly opinions, while the latter comprises constants and certainties in religion, where only acceptance, submission, and compliance are permissible.

The former invites multiplicity in readings, variations in interpretations, and even contradictions in positions and differing classifications and writings, while the latter represents a singular reading, one understanding, and one method. The latter is expected to be based on the former, seeking to clarify, explain, detail, demonstrate, and justify it, while the former governs the latter in terms of reading, interpretation, regulation, methodology, and practice.

Ibn al-Subki states in the commentary on Ibn al-Hajib's Creed: "Know that the people of the Sunnah and the community all agree on a single belief concerning what is obligatory, permissible, and impossible. However, they differ in the methods and principles that lead to this belief. Generally, through observation, they can be categorized into three groups:

Firstly- The People of Hadith: Their principles rely on auditory evidence, namely the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and consensus (ijma').

Secondly- The People of Rational Inquiry: This group includes the Ash'arites and the Hanafis (Maturidis). They are represented by their leaders, Imam Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari and Imam Abu Mansur al-Maturidi. They agree on rational principles for every matter that depends on auditory

evidence, and they agree on auditory principles that the mind can only ascertain as permissible. They differ in some specific matters of belief.

Thirdly- The People of Intuition and Revelation: This group is represented by the Sufis, whose principles initially align with those of rational inquiry and hadith but eventually rely on revelation and inspiration.

From the preceding discussion, we conclude that the scholars' statements regarding the prohibition of excuses in matters of Usul al-Din should not be interpreted in the context of contemporary doctrinal classifications or the available literature. One should not be deceived by those compilations that present themselves under titles related to Islamic creed or Usul al-Din. Many of these works do not represent fundamental beliefs where deviation leads to takfir (excommunication). It is a misconception to think that these texts encompass the doctrinal principles of the religion as outlined in the Qur'an, which should not allow for deviation, disagreement, contradiction, or opposition. The reality, however, is the opposite; differences and independent reasoning have deeply rooted themselves in the formulation of these texts, leading to a conception of Usul al-Din that is more sectarian than authentic.

It is imperative to educate the reader about the dangers of following such works and their scholarly content, as well as the claim that what is inscribed therein is the truth while everything else is false, or that what is contained within them represents the true principles of the religion, both in potential and in action. This understanding will be further developed in the upcoming sections that delineate the definite from the speculative, as this is the focal point and foundation of this research.

Subsection Two: Clarifying the Issue:

Subsection One: The Definitive and the Speculative in Creed:

The distinction between the definitive (qat'i) and the speculative (dhanni) is one of the critical issues closely related to the subject matter of this research, which revolves around identifying what excuses are permissible and whether the concepts of correctness and error pertain to religious law (shar'iyyat) or rationality (aql) irrespective of their definitiveness.

Al-Fakhr al-Razi states in this regard: "Know that whenever you grasp the high ranks and noble principles, and stand upon the problematic questions and obscure objections within each of them, you will know that certain knowledge is difficult, and having certainty in every matter to the extent of being free from doubt and confusion is rare. If that is the case, then the longing is intense,

deprivation is overwhelming, and the means are weak, while the demand is compelling." (Alrrāzy, D. T., 146)

This text is crucial for establishing the necessity of differentiating between that which is definitive and leads to certain knowledge (qat'i) and that which is not definitive and leads to speculative knowledge (dhanni). The difficulty of attaining certainty in theological discourse is apparent, which is why Al-Fakhr al-Razi is noted for stating that the meanings of words do not yield certainty. This has been questioned by both early and later scholars, though this is not the focus of our current discussion. We merely point out that "definitive" refers to that which has no possibility of doubt at all, such as rational proofs and textual evidence, if accompanied by conclusive indications of their definitiveness.

Al-Razi does not deny that textual evidence can yield certainty under these circumstances. Therefore, a more precise expression of his statement would be that the meanings of words do not yield certainty in the absence of contextual clues. The term "definitive" is also used to describe that which is recognized in customary terms as beyond doubt. Al-Razi does not reject the idea that texts and the meanings of words can provide this type of certainty, even if they are not accompanied by contextual clues, but rather in terms of custom and convention.

Subsection Two: The Relationship Between Definitive Certainty and the Multiplicity of Truth:

The discussion of definitiveness leads us to an important issue: the multiplicity of truth in rational and religious matters. Our scholars have examined this issue thoroughly, emphasizing the significant question: Is there only one truth that necessitates the condemnation and heretical classification of the dissenters, or is truth multiple, thereby legitimizing all opinions and differing views?

Discussion on Certainty in Legal Matters:

We note here that the opinions on this issue lean towards legal matters that lack definitive conclusions, that is, speculative matters. This is the subject of previous scholars' discussions. Imam al-Shawkani summarized the views on this in Irshad al-Fuhul: "They have long disagreed on this issue, and the transmission regarding it has varied greatly. A significant number believe that every opinion among the mujtahids on these speculative matters is correct, and that each one is indeed right. Al-Mawardi and Al-Ruyani reported this view from the majority. Al-Mawardi stated that this is the position of Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari and the Mu'tazilites. (Al-Shawkānī, 1419h, 2/745)

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On the other hand, Abu Hanifa, Malik, al-Shafi'i, and most jurists believe that the truth lies in one of the opinions, although it is not determined for us; it is definitively known to God. It is impossible for the same matter to be simultaneously lawful and unlawful for the same person at the same time. The Companions (may Allah be pleased with them) would correct and object to one another, and if every mujtahid's reasoning were correct, there would be no basis for correction. These scholars further disagreed, despite their consensus that the truth is one: is every mujtahid correct or not?... and so on."

Al-Shawkani then articulates his opinion on the matter: "Here is a proof that resolves the dispute and clarifies the truth so that there remains no doubt for the skeptical: the authentic hadith from multiple chains stating that when a ruler exercises judgment and is correct, he receives two rewards; and when he errs, he receives one reward. This hadith indicates that the truth is one, and some mujtahids agree with it, thus they are deemed correct and deserve two rewards, while others disagree, and they are considered mistaken. Their entitlement to reward does not imply that they are correct, and the label of error does not negate the possibility of reward. Therefore, whoever claims that every mujtahid is correct and that the truth is plural due to the differences among the mujtahids has made a clear mistake and diverged from the truth, for the Prophet (peace be upon him) categorized the mujtahids into two groups: those who are correct and those who are mistaken. If each of them were correct, this categorization would lose its significance." (Al-Shawkānī, 1419h, 2/386)

Thus, those who claim that the truth is singular and that the opponent is sinful are clearly rebutted by the hadith, which categorizes the one who does not align with the truth in their ijtihad as mistaken, while also rewarding them. The indisputable truth is that there is one truth, and the opposing individual is rewarded if they have fulfilled their duty in ijtihad and have not fallen short in their research, once they have established themselves as a mujtahid."

Shihab al-Haythami commented on the statement of Al-Busiri regarding the Companions: "They are all correct in their judgments — all of them are competent." (al-Kattānī, D. t. 2/364, 365-366)

As for the discord that occurred among the Companions, it too stems from their ijtihad, and it could also be said that this ijtihad was correct from all parties. Al-Amidi stated, "Based on this, either every mujtahid is correct, or there is one who is correct and the others are mistaken in their ijtihad. In both cases, the testimony and narration from both groups are not to be rejected. In the case of being correct, this is obvious, and in the case of error with ijtihad, it is agreed upon." (al-Andalusī, 1403h, 2/82) (al-Khaṭīb, 1400h, 404)

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Regarding Al-Anbari's position in one of the two famous reports attributed to him: "Every mujtahid is correct in those whom God gathers." As for the disbelievers, they are not correct. (Al-Shawkānī, 1419h, 259)

Al-Asnawi discussed ijtihad in cases that lack textual evidence, presenting two opinions: "The first is that Allah has no specific judgment in such matters, and the ruling of Allah in them follows the conjecture of the mujtahid. Those who hold this view believe that every mujtahid is correct; they are the Ash'aris, the judges, and the majority of theologians from the Ash'ari and Mu'tazili schools, among others." (al-Isnawī, 1420h, 4/560, 585)

He also reported that the four imams, including Al-Shafi'i, recognized both error and correctness in ijtihad. (al-Isnawī, 1420h, 4/567)

This discussion can also be applied to the issues of the science of theology, the science of fundamentals of religion, and the science of creed. In these fields, there are numerous speculative issues beyond counting and defining. It is evident that if we recognize that the definitive aspect lies solely in belief in the six pillars of faith and what is known from religion by necessity, we will understand the vastness of the theological and creedal heritage documented later on, which gives us a sense of pride and honor for the necessity that the ummah had for these matters in previous eras.

The Third Section: Rulings and Implications

Subsection One: Rulings

In discussing rulings and implications, the reader should not be led to believe that this research attempts to imitate the call some today advocate for pluralism in creed and religion, justifying it with the notion that our understanding of religious texts and foundations is inherently diverse and multiple. This diversity cannot be reduced to a single interpretation; moreover, this understanding is not only diverse and multiple but also fluid. The essence of this is that the text is silent, and there is a continuous need for evolution and effort to comprehend religious texts, interpreting them whether in jurisprudence, hadith, or the Qur'an. Since interpretation stems from a knowledge space external to religion, and this space is variable and fluid, our understandings of the text become multiple.

Thus, divine speech, according to this perspective, possesses layers of meaning, and uncovering the first layer or the superficial meaning of the text will reveal another layer of meaning. One

underlying reason for this phenomenon is that reality inherently includes multiplicity; since speech describes this reality and unveils its veil, it will consequently be diverse. This phenomenon preserves the freshness of the text and ensures its permanence. As long as no religion exists without interpretations, religious knowledge can be viewed as a collection of correct and incorrect interpretations. We find ourselves swimming in a sea of interpretations and understandings of the text. This is the essence of religion from one perspective and reflects our humanity and the structure of our cognitive faculties from another. Therefore, Sunni Islam is considered a specific understanding of Islam, while Shia Islam is regarded as another understanding of Islam. No religion throughout its history has been devoid of this multitude and diversity in the understandings of its followers. The historical multiplicity in beliefs and theological discourse across religions and sects serves as evidence of this; thus, proponents of this idea argue that one cannot adopt a single interpretation of religion as correct or as the interpretation of the saved sect. ('Abd al-Karīm, D. t. 26)

Consequently, we will present the rulings on the matter and their implications here, distancing ourselves from the intentions of these perspectives, through which the legitimacy of this path and that will be clarified.

As for the fundamentals of religion articulated in the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His beloved Prophet (peace be upon him), there is no validation for all opinions in these matters; rather, the truth and correctness in them are singular, represented by the clear pronouncements of the Qur'an and Sunnah. Whoever aligns with that pronouncement according to a well-defined understanding and a thorough, conscious reading, possessing the skill and experience in the style of the Qur'an and the modes of revelation, is the one who is correct in his reasoning and will be rewarded for his judgments and choices.

This assertion is based on the prior statement that imitation (taqlid) is impermissible in this domain. Abu al-Khattab stated, "It is not permissible to imitate in the five pillars of Islam and similar matters that are well-known and transmitted through continuous narrations, for the common people share with the scholars in this; thus, there is no justification for imitation." (Ibn Qudāmah, 1423h, , p. 206). Imitation necessitates the ignorance of the imitator regarding that which he imitates, which is impossible concerning what is known by necessity. Knowledge of these pillars is based on necessity derived from consensus and continuous transmission, which comprise rational and transmitted elements.

Al-Shawkani said, "The majority holds that it is impermissible, and this was related by Professor Abu Ishaq in his explanation of the arrangement based on the consensus of the scholars of truth and others among various sects. Abu al-Husayn al-Qattan stated, 'We do not know of any disagreement regarding the prohibition of imitation in monotheism,' and al-Sam'ani narrated this from all theologians and a group of jurists. Al-Imam al-Haramayn mentioned in *Al-Shamil*, 'No one has claimed imitation in the fundamentals except for the Hanbalis.' Al-Isfarayini stated, 'Only the people of outward texts disagree with this.'" (Al-Shawkānī, 1419h, 2/231-232)

Subsection Two: The Implications of Validation and Refutation

First: The Rift Between Schools of Thought

Anyone who examines the theological atmosphere will observe that the closure has reached expansive limits within the theological heritage, leading to a rift among them. Issues are often included in doctrinal works as a scientific necessity, even though they are not central to theology nor derived from it. Instead, they were included due to differences between sects, similar to many issues scattered in doctrinal writings, such as the rulings on leadership (imamate), the Companions (sahabah), the ranking among them, matters of wiping over the socks (masah 'ala al-khuffain), and so on, reaching the rulings on excommunication (takfir), denunciation (tafsiq), and innovation (tabdi'), which are essentially religious rulings, not rational ones.

Imam al-Sabki (may Allah have mercy on him) affirmed this by stating, "Among the conditions for excommunicating a specific person is the acknowledgment of that person; it is unlikely that such acknowledgment will occur. Excommunication is not denied if its condition is met, and it is not sufficient to merely say, 'This is from that sect.' Although it is generally ruled that one who believes in something that entails excommunication is a disbeliever, he continued: 'I have indeed seen compositions from a group who are thought to be among the people of knowledge, who cling to some narratives of hadith, and perhaps they possess some rituals and acts of worship and are renowned for their knowledge. They spoke of things and narrated matters indicative of their profound ignorance... They hasten to excommunicate those who do not deserve excommunication, and the cause of that is nothing but their excessive ignorance and partisanship, having been raised on something they know nothing else but, which is false, and they have not engaged in any knowledge to understand; rather, they are in utmost folly.'" (al-Subkī, 1423h, , p. 524)

In "The History" by Ibn Asakir, Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) said: "Whoever exposes himself to suspicion should not blame those who think poorly of him. Do not assume that a word

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spoken by your brother is evil; rather, find a good interpretation for it. Assume the best of your brother until what contradicts that assumption comes to you." (Ibn 'Asākir, 1426 H, 47/35)

Secondly: The Domination of Rationalist Thought over Qur'anic Thought:

This became clearly evident when the readings of the mutakallimun (theologians) and the intellectual schools in Islam became the doctrines that allowed each group, trend, and school to adopt various perspectives and interpretations as the basis for disagreement and dispute. These schools produced treatises entitled "doctrine," such as al-Nasafi's "Aqidah," al-Nizamiyyah, al-Esfara'iniyyah, al-Tahawi, and others. Although these are commendable efforts in their context, the error lies with the recipient who believes that the contents of these works constitute the doctrine revealed by divine revelation and the Qur'an. In this cloudy atmosphere, the doctrine of the Qur'an and its methodology, along with the foundations for establishing Islamic doctrine, disappeared. The rhetorical debates consumed the doctrinal classifications, leaving many negative repercussions that exceed enumeration in the imagination of both individual and collective Muslim societies. They established principles that are not principles and branches that are not branches, contributing to the emergence of extremist thought when those artificial theological and doctrinal readings were inflated to replace the scientific Qur'anic foundations. This led to the veneration of the non-sacred and the draining of the sacred of its sacred meaning, resulting in people falling into excess and deficiency or into dilution and strictness.

One of the results of errors in the theological study and the absence of a purposeful distinction between Qur'anic doctrine and theological doctrine was the emergence of issues whose origins were political, which were exaggerated in contrast to the diminishing and disappearance of issues that are of pressing need in light of contemporary developments. The theological heritage remained confined to those issues that arose during a specific period, such as the creation of the Qur'an, the imamate, compulsion and choice, personal freedom, and issues of conflict and disagreement with philosophical schools, while treatments and foundations for dealing with new circumstances disappeared. Consequently, the lack of a purposive approach in the theological heritage led to an understanding of reality only through the eyes of the past, catering to the public and venerating the past and its predecessors from the early generations.

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Conclusion

1. The philosophy of correction and criticism is a vast topic in the foundational studies and has an even greater scope in theological discourse, or at least it should.

2. Early scholars confined this topic to foundational studies, excluding theological discourse, thereby justifying differences in jurisprudence but not in theology, despite the fact that theology warrants the philosophy of correction and criticism due to the seriousness of these discussions in rational matters.

3. Correction is a crucial necessity in both ancient and contemporary theological studies to prevent the inflation of issues and titles that replace the Qur'anic doctrines, which should not be a subject of disagreement, contradiction, or opposition.

4. Any understanding that scholars have practiced regarding what is established in the Qur'anic doctrine—whether through inference, elaboration, implication, diversification, or differing interpretations, resulting in opposition and contradictions among perspectives—falls within the realm of theology, not the Qur'anic doctrine.

5. The Qur'anic doctrine is a clear verbal expression that does not require tools, sciences, or knowledge to understand it, other than the language in which the Qur'an was revealed.

6. Any understanding practiced by schools in Islam regarding the Qur'anic doctrine can only be right in one sense, and there is no excuse for those who err in their understanding of the meanings of the Qur'anic doctrine. In contrast, the situation is different in theological discourse; it is natural for there to be differences and disputes among perspectives and interpretations, and thus the philosophy of correction must be activated here.

7. Any understanding practiced by theological schools that has led to innovation, condemnation, or excommunication was, in reality, subjected to the principles, knowledge limits, and intellectual foundations of that school.

8. Any rupture that occurred in theological and doctrinal thought stemmed from the activation of school-based foundations and the dominance of their epistemological limitations over Qur'anic principles.

9. Any understanding that inflated over others was primarily due to political motivations and its triumph over others, being the main cause and active agent in its inflation and prominence over others.

10. The purpose of doctrine is not to obligate people and reprimand them for their mistakes or seek out their errors; rather, it is to seek justifications and correct opinions and beliefs, which should be among the top priorities of scholars.

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